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Abstract 
This article analyses the relationships among the unit of account and means of 
exchange functions of an international currency, on the one hand, and its store 
of value in official use, on the other hand. Historical evidence links the 
currency composition of reserves to currency movements. The currency 
composition of reserves is strongly related in the cross-section to both 
currency movements and the currency denomination of trade. Data limitations 
make it hard to distinguish these two factors. A panel analysis of 5 countries 
from central and eastern Europe shows that both trade invoicing and currency 
movements drive changing official reserve composition. Implications are 
suggested for the prospects for the renminbi enlarging its current small portion 
of official foreign exchange reserves. 
Keywords: International currency, currency denomination of trade, currency 
composition of official reserves, dollar zone. 
JEL classification: E58, F31, F33. 
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1. Introduction 
The renminbi has recently reached 1% of global foreign exchange reserves, (BIS 
(2015, p 85); IMF (2015, p 23)). This follows a rising share of Chinese trade that is 
denominated in, or at least settled in, renminbi (Ito and Chinn (2015)). This also 
follows analyses that claim (and deny) that the renminbi’s movements substantially 
influence movements of neighbouring currencies (Subramanian and Kessler (2013); 
Shu et al (2014); Kawai and Pontines (2015).  
The ongoing internationalisation of the renminbi recalls the long-running 
discussion of the various functions of international currencies, as summarised in the 
famous table of Kenen (1983, Table 1). The issues raised by the renminbi’s 
increasing international use also bring to mind the many unresolved questions of 
the relationship among the various uses of international currencies.  
This article places itself in the line of Heller and Knight (1998), Dooley et al 
(1989) and Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) by investigating the empirical 
determinants of the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves (the bolded 
upper-right entry in Table 1). In particular, we focus for explanation of reserve 
composition on the two unit of account concepts, the anchoring of a given currency 
as between dollar, euro and yen (Haldane and Hall (1991), Frankel and Wei (1996)), 
on the one hand, and the currency denomination of trade, on the other (the bolded 
and italicised entries in the middle column of Table 1). For the latter we use updated 
data as described in Ito and Chinn (2015).  
Understanding the currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves is 
of particular interest now. At the end of 2014, emerging market reserves reached 
$7.7 trillion. There is now a debate regarding whether 2014 may prove to have been 
the time of ―peak reserves‖, to be followed by an extended draw-down of reserves 
as countries, including China, resist currency depreciation against a rising dollar 
(Winkler et al (2015)). To some extent, the reserve drawdown is the counterpart of 
emerging market firms reducing their net dollar liabilities.
 1
 If portfolio balance helps 
to determine major exchange rates (Blanchard et al (2005)), emerging market firms’ 
repayment of dollar debt matched by a liquidation of official reserves can serve 
further to strengthen the dollar (and to put upward pressure on bond yields)..
2
 The 
 
1
  For a discussion of net repayment of foreign currency debt by the non-official sector in China in the 
first quarter of 2015, see McCauley (2015), and for emerging market dollar debt more generally, see 
McCauley et al (2015). 
2
  The latter portfolio balance effect has been dubbed ―quantitative tightening‖ by Winkler et al 
(2015), to contrast it to the ongoing bond buying of the ECB and the Bank of Japan. See discussion 
in BIS (2015, pp 94-95. Debelle (2015) frames the Chinese reserve decumulation as a sectoral shift 
from the public sector holdings of external assets to private sector holdings: ―That is, a fair part of 
what is going at the moment is a shift in who is holding foreign assets in China, not necessarily a 
 
International currency functions by sector Table 1 
 Means of exchange Unit of account Store of value 
Official Intervention currency  Currency anchoring  Foreign exchange reserves  
Private Vehicles in forex market  Denomination of trade  Internat’l assets and debts  
Sources: Kenen (1983). 
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more that emerging market central banks have diversified from the dollar, the more 
their reserve decumulation might put added upward pressure on the dollar, as they 
sell dollars for domestic currency and then sell euros and other currencies for 
dollars to rebalance their portfolios. The currency composition of emerging market 
reserves could matter in 2016 and beyond. 
This article is structured as follows. The second section recalls the grounds on 
which the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves can be chosen. The 
third section discusses historical evidence on the role of changes in the orientation 
of the domestic currency to key international currencies and changes in the 
currency composition of reserves. The fourth section uses the current cross-section 
of evidence to run a horserace between currency movements and the currency 
composition of the invoicing of trade. The fifth section discusses the evidence of 
central and eastern European currencies from the 1990s to date as their trade 
became increasingly dominated by the euro area. The sixth section concludes. 
2. Explaining the currency composition of forex reserves  
How should reserve managers choose the currency composition of their reserves? 
The numeraire that is used to measure risks and returns has a very strong influence 
on calculated optimal currency allocations (Papaioannou et al (2006), Borio et al 
(2008a)). Its choice depends on the intended uses of the reserves. If reserves are 
held mainly to intervene in the currency market, then a plausible numeraire would 
be the currency against which the domestic currency trades most heavily, especially 
in the spot market where most central banks operate. If reserves are held mainly to 
insure purchases of foreign goods and services, then an import basket would be 
plausible, or the currency denomination of trade might be the point of reference. 
Or, if reserves are held mainly as a hedge against (or to pay) debt service, the 
currency composition of outstanding debt would be a plausible choice. 
The domestic currency may serve as the numeraire for economic or institutional 
reasons. Where reserves exceed transaction or insurance needs, their value as 
domestic wealth can be measured in terms of domestic currency. Or, the domestic 
currency may be used as numeraire owing to its use in valuing foreign exchange 
reserves in striking the central bank’s accounting profit and reported capital. These 
may affect a central bank’s reputation or even its operational independence. 
A survey found a considerable range of choice (Borio et al (2008b)). About a 
third of central banks used the domestic currency, a fifth a basket of foreign 
currencies and the rest a single foreign currency. One third used the US dollar. 
Some central banks used different numeraires for different portfolio tranches, which 
themselves were distinguished by use (eg liquidity versus investment). 
The next section provides historical evidence consistent with the use of the 
domestic currency as numeraire. The share of the dollar in reserves is higher where 
the domestic currency varies less against the dollar than other major currencies. 
 
large change in the total quantity of foreign assets being held by China. What matters for global 
financial markets is the difference in portfolio allocation between the public and private sector in 
China‖. However, if the counterpart of the reserve decumulation is the private sector’s building up 
US dollar deposits, then the sale of bonds from reserves has no counterpart in private  purchases of 
bonds.  
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3. The historical evidence 
The spotty historical record of changes in the composition of reserves is quite 
telling. Looking back to the interwar period and the 1960s and 1970s: as economies 
joined (or left) the sterling area, their reserve composition shifted towards (or away 
from) sterling. In the period since 1990, the relative stability of the dollar share of 
reserves reflects the stability of the dollar zone at more than half of global output. In 
both cases, we observe that reserves are held in the major currencies that move less 
against the domestic currency. 
3.1 Entering and leaving the sterling area 
Historically, reserve shifts by those authorities whose currencies entered or left the 
sterling area show the logic of matching the reserve portfolio to the currency 
anchor at work. After the Scandinavian currencies joined the sterling area in the 
wake of the UK currency’s 1931 floating (Drummond (2008)), central banks shifted 
their reserves into sterling.
3
  Similarly, after the yen was pegged to sterling in 1934, 
sterling’s share of Japanese reserves soared from 15% in 1932 to 90% in 1935 
(Hatase and Ohnuki (2009), Figure 3).  
Conversely, after leaving the sterling area, monetary authorities cut their 
holdings of sterling. For instance, in the 1968 Basel sterling agreement, the Bank of 
England guaranteed the dollar value of the 99% of Hong Kong’s reserves that were 
invested in sterling (Schenk (2010), pp 295–6). After Hong Kong replaced its peg to 
sterling with its first dollar peg in July 1972, the proportion of Hong Kong’s reserves 
held in dollars rose to 20% in September 1974 (Schenk (2009)) – and to 75% now, 
31 years after the subsequent peg to the dollar in 1983.  
Similar observations hold for less extreme reserve portfolios in the sterling area. 
In 1968, the Bank of England guaranteed the dollar value of the 70%, 45% and 40% 
of their reserves that were invested in sterling by New Zealand, Iceland and 
Australia, respectively. After the Australian and New Zealand dollars were pegged to 
the US dollar in the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971, and then both to 
baskets by July 1973, the sterling share fell to about 20% by 1974 for Australia and 
by 1977 for New Zealand (Schenk and Singleton (2015)). Today, New Zealand, 
Iceland and Australia hold 15%, 15% and 0% of their reserves in sterling and 25%, 
40% and 55% in dollars, as described below. 
3.2 The dollar zone and the dollar share of reserves since 1990 
The dollar’s role as reference for other countries’ exchange rates ranges from dollar 
pegs to largely market-driven co-movements under free-floating regimes as 
influenced by interest rate policies. By examining the degree of co-movements, and 
predefining the set of key currencies, we derive a measure of each such currency’s 
zone of influence using simple regression techniques (see Annex of McCauley and 
Chan (2014) for details). We use the euro (before 1999, the Deutsche mark) and yen 
as the other candidate reference currencies, consistent with their status as the 
 
3
  Personal communication with Marc Flandreau.  
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second and third most transacted currencies in the Triennial Central Bank Survey of 
Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity. 
We then define not a tightly linked dollar bloc, but rather a fuzzier dollar zone. 
A given country’s GDP contributes to this zone in proportion to its currency’s dollar 
weight. So defined, the dollar zone accounts for more than half of global GDP.
4
 
By this measure, the US dollar’s pre-eminence as a reference currency lines up 
with its relative role as store of value for official reserves. The dollar zone has been 
close to 60% of global GDP and has shown little trend since 1990 (Graph 1, blue line 
in the left-hand panel). This 60% is much closer to the dollar share of reserves than 
the global share of the US economy (here measured in PPP terms, but the point 
would still hold at market values). The euro zone share of global GDP is now around 
25%, just above the euro’s (reduced) share of reserves. The yen trails. 
A stable dollar zone share of global GDP is at first puzzling, given that the 
euro’s influence has extended east in Europe (ECB (2014)), to commodity currencies 
and even to emerging Asia. However, Asia’s fast growth has offset the euro’s wider 
influence, given the diminished yet still strong dollar linkage of Asian currencies.  
In sum, the dollar’s share in global forex reserves tracks over time the share of 
the dollar zone in global output. Together with the cross-sectional evidence to 
which we now turn, this evidence suggests the importance of portfolio 
considerations and the domestic currency numeraire. With the cross-sectional 
evidence, we can also test the importance of the currency denomination of trade. 
 
Size of currency zones and global reserve composition 
In per cent Graph 1 
US dollar  Euro  Yen 
 
 
 
 
 
1  Zone share estimated as own economy’s share of PPP GDP, plus the elasticity-weighted share of all other economies’ PPP GDPs. The 
elasticities are derived from a regression of weekly changes in the domestic currency/US dollar rate against a constant, and changes in the 
euro/dollar (prior to 1999, Deutsche mark/dollar) and yen/dollar rates, during the corresponding year. Negative values of the yen bloc arise 
from negative coefficients on the yen, which can be interpreted as reflecting the use of the yen as the funding currency in carry trades. 
Sources: IMF; Datastream; national data; BIS calculations. 
 
 
4
  Cf Kawai and Akiyama (1998), Bénassy-Quéré et al (2006) and Bracke and Bunda (2011). 
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4. Current cross-sectional evidence 
The insight that the way a currency trades against the major currencies guides the 
choice of the currency denomination of reserves has found only limited use in 
previous cross-sectional studies. IMF studies of confidential data, whether Heller 
and Knight (1978), Dooley et al (1989) or Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000), use 
dummies for pegs. They thus restrict to only extreme cases a test of the connection 
between currency anchoring and reserve composition. 
Dollar trade invoicing encourages exporters (especially commodity exporters) 
to borrow dollars to hedge and importers to borrow dollars for working capital. 
Servicing dollar debts tilts trading towards the dollar, encouraging reserve 
managers to hold dollars.  
Does a currency’s dollar weight influence the share of the US dollar in the 
corresponding country’s official reserves? Or, does the country’s share of the US 
dollar in trade invoicing matter more for the share of the US dollar in its official 
reserves? We examine first bivariate relationships then run the horserace. 
4.1 Bivariate relationships 
The limited cross-sectional evidence strongly suggests both linkages. In a sample 
selected by availability, a currency’s dollar zone weight is positively correlated with 
the dollar share in the corresponding country’s official reserves (Graph 2). Broadly, 
central banks in the Americas heavily weight the dollar, which remains the most 
important influence on their currencies despite the rising importance of the euro. 
Most European central banks do not hold such a high share of dollars, and Russia, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are in between. Fully two 
thirds of the variation in the dollar share in foreign exchange reserves can be 
accounted for by the currencies’ average dollar zone weight in 2010–13. 
The slope of the least squares line (in red in Graph 2) is not 1 (dashed blue line), 
as would be the case if reserve managers on average chose the dollar weight to 
minimise the variance of their portfolios in domestic currency. Instead, the estimate 
of the slope of one half points to some departure from the minimum variance 
portfolio, perhaps in some cases to raise expected funds. The two exceptions are 
countries with currencies pegged to the euro, Bulgaria and Lithuania. 
The necessary caveat to this strong finding is that the sample may not be 
representative. At the end of 2013, the 25 economies in Graph 2 accounted for $3.1 
trillion of reserves, 30% of the global total not held by the United States, the euro 
area and Japan.
5
 The 25 clearly oversample small and advanced economies. Among 
the top 20 holders of reserves, emerging market economies Brazil, Hong Kong SAR, 
India, Korea, Russia, and Turkey are included, but seven are not: China, Saudi Arabia, 
Chinese Taipei, Singapore, Mexico, Algeria and Thailand. 
 
 
 
5
  Since the G3 countries cannot hold their own currencies in their reserves, they face a different set of 
choices from other reserve holders. 
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Dollar zone weight and dollar share of forex reserves, 2013 Graph 2 
 
AU = Australia; BG = Bulgaria; BR = Brazil; CA = Canada; CH = Switzerland; CL = Chile; CO = Colombia; 
CZ = Czech Republic; GB = United Kingdom; HK = Hong Kong SAR; HR = Croatia; IN = India; IS = Iceland; 
KR = Korea; LT = Lithuania; NO = Norway; NZ = New Zealand; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; 
RO = Romania; RU = Russia; SE = Sweden; TR = Turkey; UY = Uruguay. 
1  Average over four years.    2  For AU, June 2013; CO, March 2011; IN, 2014; NZ, September 2010; TR, 2012. 
Sources: R Sarin and S Singh, ―RBI: Raise share of dollar in foreign exchange reserves‖, The Indian Express, 9 
January 2015; national data; BIS calculations. 
 
Given that previous work has used currency pegs, but not behavioural anchors, 
to explain the currency composition of reserves, it strengthens our result to note 
that it does not depend on pegs. In particular, if we exclude Bulgaria, Hong Kong 
and Lithuania, the estimated relationship is indistinguishable statistically from that 
in Graph 2. Furthermore, if we exclude currencies that the IMF (2013, pp 5–6) 
characterises as having a ―crawl-like‖ (Croatia) or ―other managed arrangement‖ 
(Russia and Switzerland), the result does not change much. All in all, the relationship 
does not depend on economies where the currency is heavily managed. 
What about the link between the dollar share in official reserves and that in 
trade invoicing? Despite a limited number of observations, we find a positive 
relationship between the two (Graph 3, left hand panel).
6
 The slope is about the 
same, but the regression line fits the data less well. Brazil, Sweden, and Turkey hold 
more reserves in the dollar than one might guess from the share of dollars in their 
export invoicing. Bulgaria and Lithuania do not hold dollar reserves even though a 
fair fraction of their exports in the US dollar. 
This result warrants further examination. We should expect the dollar zone 
weight and the dollar share in trade invoicing to be correlated. At the limit, if a 
country pegs its currency to another anchor currency such as the U.S. dollar or the 
euro, it surely would tend to invoice its exports in the anchor currency.
7
 Or, given 
pervasive dollar invoicing, the policy of a dollar peg may have appeal: the reverse 
causality can also be valid. In fact, regressing the dollar share in export invoicing on 
 
 
6
  Using the dollar share in import invoicing instead, the positive correlation is no longer significant 
with the adjusted R
2
 falling considerably. The UK, Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria are outliers with 
their dollar share in reserves low but the dollar share in import invoicing high; conversely, Turkey 
and Brazil have high dollar shares in reserves but low dollar shares in import invoicing. 
7
  Ito and Chinn (2015) show that those countries that peg their currencies to the dollar (euro) tend to 
invoice their exports in the dollar (euro). 
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Dollar shares of forex reserves and export invoicing Graph 3 
 
 
 
AU = Australia; BG = Bulgaria; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CZ = Czech Republic; GB = United Kingdom; HU = Hungary; ID = Indonesia; 
IN = India; IS = Iceland; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; LT = Lithuania; NO = Norway; NZ = New Zealand; PL = Poland; RO = Romania; 
SE = Sweden; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; US = United States; XM = Euro area; ZA = South Africa. 
1  For AU, June 2013; IN, 2014; NZ, September2010; TR, 2012.    2  Average over four years. 
Sources: H Ito and M Chinn (2014 and updates); R Sarin and S Singh, ―RBI: Raise share of dollar in foreign exchange reserves‖ , The Indian 
Express, 9 January 2015; national data; BIS calculation. 
 
the dollar zone weight yields an estimated coefficient of 0.6, significantly different 
from zero, and an adjusted R
2
 of 70% (Graph 3, right-hand panel).  
Since the various functions of an international money mutually reinforce each 
other, it is interesting to bring into the analysis the private means of exchange 
function, namely the vehicle currency against which the domestic currency trades in 
the currency market (the lower left-hand entry on Table 1). Particularly if reserves 
are not large, the extent to which domestic currency trades against the dollar in the 
foreign exchange market could constrain the choice of the dollar share of reserves. 
Our measure of the share of dollar trading is derived from the results for spot 
trading in the Triennial Survey of April 2013, which improved on reporting on a 
range of emerging market currencies. 
On a bivariate basis, the share of dollar trading in the spot market does line up 
with the share of dollar reserves (Graph 4, left-hand panel). This is not surprising 
because the share of dollar trading is also linked to the dollar zone share (Graph 4, 
right-hand panel).
8
 A one percent increase in the dollar share of spot trading is 
associated with a half percentage point increase in the share of dollar reserves. 
To summarise the bivariate analysis of the cross-section, the currency 
composition of reserves is strongly related to both currency movements and the 
currency denomination of trade, which are themselves quite strongly related. The 
vehicle currency in the foreign exchange market is less strongly related to the 
currency composition of reserves or currency movement. We turn to a multivariate 
analysis of the limited cross-sectional evidence.  
 
 
 
8
  The share of dollar trading is also correlated with the dollar share in export invoicing. However, the 
goodness of fit is much smaller (10%) and the slope is about half of that in the estimation on the 
dollar zone share (0.327) with a lower level of significance (10%). 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
9 
 
Dollar share in reserves vs dollar share in FX transactions Graph 4 
 
 
 
AU = Australia; AR = Argentina; BG = Bulgaria; BR = Brazil; CA = Canada; CH = Switzerland; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech 
Republic; HK = Hong Kong SAR; HU = Hungary; ID = Indonesia; IL = Israel; IN = India; KR = Korea; LT = Lithuania; MX = Mexico; 
MY = Malaysia; NO = Norway; NZ = New Zealand; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland; RO = Romania; RU = Russia; SA = Saudi 
Arabia; SE = Sweden; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; TW = Chinese Taipei; ZA = South Africa. 
1  For AU, June 2013; CO, March 2011; IN, 2014; NZ, September2010; TR, 2012.    2  Average over four years. 
Sources: R Sarin and S Singh, ―RBI: Raise share of dollar in foreign exchange reserves‖, The Indian Express, 9 January 2015; national data; BIS 
Triennial Survey; BIS calculation. 
4.2 Multivariate relationships 
In a multivariate setting, we regress the dollar share of reserves on various 
combinations of the dollar share in export invoicing, the dollar zone share, and the 
dollar share in spot market turnover. As plotted above, these three variables are 
correlated with each other. Despite the small number of observations, our purpose 
is to run a horserace among currency movements, currency transaction volumes, 
and the currency composition of the invoicing of trade. Which variable(s) best 
explain the cross-sectional variation in the dollar share in official reserves? 
As shown above, the three variables explain well the dollar share in official 
foreign reserves individually (columns (1) through (3) in Table 2) with the dollar zone 
share scoring the highest bivariate goodness of fit. The multivariate estimations in 
columns (4) through (7) confirm multicollinearity among these variables with the 
estimated coefficients and the statistical significance of individual variables 
dropping toward zero. In the head-to-head race between trade invoicing and the 
dollar zone weight (column (4)), with its limited number of observations (just 16!), 
the individual effects of the dollar share in export invoicing or of the dollar zone 
cannot be distinguished, though they are jointly significant. The dollar zone share 
dominates the dollar share in foreign-exchange trading (column (6)), which in turn 
dominates the dollar share of export invoicing (column (5)).  
To summarise the multivariate analysis, trade invoicing and the dollar zone 
share are jointly significant, but too closely related to each other to distinguish. 
There is thus scope for further analysis using a small panel of European emerging 
market economies. 
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Cross-section analysis: reserves, trade denomination and currency movements 
Dependent variable: share of US dollar in reserves in 2013 Table 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
% of USD  0.49   0.19 0.07  0.29 
in exports (0.16)***   (0.33) (0.20)  (0.39) 
$ Zone   0.51  0.29  0.43 -0.28 
Weight  (0.08)***  (0.28)  (0.11)*** (0.41) 
%USD in    0.48  0.53 0.15 0.63 
FX   (0.15)***  (0.16)*** (0.14) (0.22)** 
N 16 25 20 16 13 20 13 
Adj. R2 0.36 0.64 0.34 0.36 0.67 0.63 0.65 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. t-statistics are in brackets. The estimates of the constant term are omitted. 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
5. The central and eastern European panel 
While the choice of reserve currencies can be relatively stable for developed 
economies, emerging market economies, may experience changes in the underlying 
drivers and thus change the currency composition of their official reserves. 
Furthermore, reserve managers may manage their reserves more cautiously when 
these are demanded for precautionary reasons, but less cautiously if reserves 
accumulate as a side effect of policies to nurture the traded goods sectors 
(Aizenman and Lee (2007)).  
The European emerging market economies for which we have collected data on 
currency composition of foreign exchange reserves have gone through dramatic 
changes in their economic systems and structures since the demise of the Soviet-
bloc in the early 1990s. In particular, the six emerging market economies in Eastern 
Europe, namely, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Romania, and Russia 
have experienced varying degrees of integration with the European Union. In terms 
of currency, these countries’ initial orientation toward the dollar or baskets giving 
substantial weights to the dollar (McCauley (1997)) after the breakdown of the 
Soviet bloc tended to give way to the Deutsche mark and then the euro as regional 
economic integration deepened. These experiences could be expected to have led 
to interrelated variation in the trade denomination, currency movements and the 
composition of their reserves holdings.  
Graph 5 illustrates the development of the share of the US dollar in reserves 
holding, the dollar zone weight, and export invoicing for the six Eastern European 
countries in the period of 1997 – 2013. While the US dollar share in reserves holding 
is moderately declining for all the economies, the share in the dollar zone weight 
shows a drastic decline. The rise in the euro share in export invoicing reflects the 
economic integration these economies experienced in this period, as well as the 
observed tendency for the euro area’s trade to be denominated in euro to a greater 
extent over time. This means the US dollar share in export invoicing gradually fell for 
Croatia, Czech Republic and rather drastically for Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania.  
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Shares of US dollar in export invoicing, currency movements and reserve holding 
In percent Graph 5 
Bulgaria  Croatia 
 
 
 
Czech Republic  Poland 
 
 
 
Romania  Russia 
 
 
 
1  Average over four years. 
Sources: H Ito and M Chinn (2014 and updates); Datastream; national data, BIS calculations. 
 
Although it is difficult to generalise the patterns of development in the US 
dollar share in the three different types of transactions, inspection of the panels for 
Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania suggests that the decline in the US dollar share may 
start with export invoicing, then proceed in the dollar zone weight and finally reach 
foreign exchange reserves. This seems to follow the sequence of economic 
liberalisation recommended by McKinnon (1993): current account transactions, then 
capital account transactions. However, in fact, these countries tended to embrace 
big bang liberalisation, liberalising everything at once. The gravity model tells us 
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that these countries naturally trade with the euro area, their small size suggests their 
exporting to the big euro market with euro invoicing. Both trade partners and trade 
invoicing encourage a more stable exchange rate against the euro than the dollar, 
either as a market outcome (eg Poland) or as a policy choice (eg Bulgaria). Once the 
currency is more stable against the euro than the dollar, euro-denominated reserves 
make for more stable reserves when valued in domestic currency. 
Our sample of Eastern European countries allows us to assemble a panel 
dataset and to investigate whether and to what extent the cross-sectional 
correlation holds between the US dollar share in reserves and the share in dollar 
zone weight or export invoicing. Due to data limitations, we do not further analyse 
the correlation between the dollar reserve share and the dollar share in spot 
exchange market turnover.  
The panel structure of the dataset suggests the estimation exercise should 
account for potential unobservable country effects. However, it is not clear whether 
unobservable country effects are systematic (i.e., correlated with predictors), which 
requires estimation with fixed effects, or not systematic, which requires random 
effects. Hausman tests give mixed results depending on the sample, which must be 
partly due to the small sample sizes. Hence, we report the results from OLS (i.e., 
pooled) estimates and those with random and fixed effects. 
As observed in the cross-sectional analysis, a higher dollar share in export 
invoicing leads to a higher dollar share in reserves holding, but only when we 
control for country specific effects (Table 3, column (2-3)). A one percentage point 
increase in the dollar invoicing share would lead to a 0.65 increase in the dollar 
reserve share in the estimation with fixed effects (column (2)) and a 0.51 increase 
with the random effects (column (3)). A smaller, but strongly significant, effect is 
found for the dollar zone share regardless of whether or not one controls for 
country effects (columns (4-9)). Unlike in the cross-sectional analysis, both effects 
emerge as significant when we include both the dollar invoicing share and the dollar 
zone weight (columns (8) and (9)), with the impact of the former larger in 
magnitude, especially with fixed effects (column (8)).  
 
Panel analysis of the US dollar share of reserves in central and eastern Europe 
Dependent variable: share of US dollar in reserves, unbalanced panel 1998-2013 Table 3 
 OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
% of USD  -0.15 0.67 0.53    -0.24 0.61 0.26 
in exports (0.20) (0.20)*** (0.17)***    (0.15) (0.19)*** (0.15)* 
Dollar Zone     0.31 0.23 0.24 0.41 0.15 0.20 
Weight    (0.05)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)** (0.06)*** 
N 51 51 51 82 82 82 51 51 51 
Adj. R2 -0.01 0.10 . 0.31 0.22 . 0.40 0.21 . 
Overall R2 . 0.01 0.01 . 0.32 0.32 . 0.04 0.22 
Between R2 . 0.06 0.06 . 0.46 0.46 . 0.14 0.30 
Within R2 . 0.21 0.21 . 0.28 0.28 . 0.32 0.26 
Notes: OLS denotes ordinary least squares; FE, fixed effects; RE, random effects. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. t-statistics are in brackets. 
Estimates of the constant term are not reported. 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
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As Graph 6 shows, the data on the euro share in export invoicing is more 
available than that of the dollar. The Annex repeats the analysis of Table 3 using the 
euro share in exports instead of the dollar share, in order to gain observations. The 
results are qualitatively similar, albeit more demanding to interpret share.  
The data plotted on Graph 6 allow us to examine our question from entirely 
different angle. That is, we examine whether the euro share of foreign reserves for 
our sample countries is driven by the euro share in the countries’ export invoicing, 
the euro zone weight, or both. One expects the estimates of the coefficients on the 
 
Shares of euro in export invoicing, currency movement, and reserves holding 
In per cent Graph 6 
Bulgaria  Croatia 
 
 
 
Czech Republic  Poland 
 
 
 
Romania  Russia 
 
 
 
1  Average over four years. 
Sources: H Ito and M Chinn (2014 and updates); Datastream; national data, BIS calculations. 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
14 
 
explanatory variables to have the same signs as in the dollar share estimations. So; 
the higher euro share in a country’s exports, and the more stability the country 
pursues in the exchange rate movement against the euro, the higher should be the 
share of reserves in the euro. Besides getting us more observations, this different 
perspective provides a robustness check. 
The results of the analysis focused on euro prove consistent with the results of 
the analysis focused on the dollar. The greater use of the euro in export invoicing 
leads to higher levels of euro-denominated foreign reserves, which is still the case 
when we control for the euro zone weight (Table 4, columns (1-3, 7-9)). Compared 
to the estimations with the US dollar share in reserves (Table 3), the magnitude of 
the estimates for the effect of the euro share in export invoicing on the euro reserve 
share is generally greater in size. A percentage point increase in the euro share in 
export invoicing leads to a 0.72-0.82 increase in the euro share in foreign reserves 
(Table 4, columns (1-3, 7-9)), with its effect closer to the 1:1 ratio. Conversely, the 
impact of the euro zone weight on the euro reserve share is smaller compared to 
that of the dollar zone weight on the dollar share of foreign reserves. Furthermore, 
when the estimation includes both the euro share in export invoicing and the euro 
zone weight measure, the euro zone weight becomes insignificant. 
When the above estimations are repeated using the dollar- or euro-share in 
import invoicing, the results are qualitatively similar. That strengthens the results 
presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
Stepping back, we find that the decline in the dollar share of official foreign 
exchange reserves that was observed in all six emerging market economies in 
central and eastern Europe resulted from both shift away from dollar export 
invoicing and a shift toward greater currency movement against the dollar. 
Increasing trade integration with the euro area led to more euro export invoicing, 
and more discontinuously, to a shift toward more stable currencies vis-à-vis the 
euro. Given these dynamics, the more gradually moving trade invoicing emerges 
from the panel analysis as a stronger drive in the declining dollar share of reserves.   
 
Panel analysis of the euro share of reserves in central and eastern Europe 
Dependent variable: share of Euro in reserves, unbalanced panel 1998-2013 Table 4 
 OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
% of Euro -0.20 0.82 0.80    -0.63 0.78 0.72 
in exports (0.30) (0.16)*** (0.16)***    (0.29)** (0.19)*** (0.19)*** 
Euro Zone     0.18 0.07 0.08 0.34 0.02 0.03 
Weight    (0.08)** (0.04)* (0.04)** (0.09)*** (0.05) (0.05) 
N 66 66 66 79 79 79 66 66 66 
Adj. R2 -0.01 0.24 . 0.05 -0.03 . 0.18 0.23 . 
Overall R2 . 0.01 0.01 . 0.07 0.07 . 0.00 0.00 
Between R2 . 0.19 0.19 . 0.21 0.21 . 0.16 0.13 
Within R2 . 0.30 0.30 . 0.05 0.05 . 0.30 0.30 
Notes: OLS denotes ordinary least squares; FE, fixed effects; RE, random effects. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. t-statistics are in brackets. 
Estimates of the constant term are not reported. 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
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6. Conclusions 
This article analyses the relationships among the unit of account and means of 
exchange functions of an international currency, on the one hand, and its store of 
value in official use, on the other hand. Historical evidence links the currency 
composition of reserves to currency movements. The currency composition of 
reserves is strongly related in the cross-section to both currency movements and 
the currency denomination of trade. In particular, we find that the higher the extent 
of export invociing in the dollar and the higher the co-movement of a given 
currency with the dollar, the higher the dollar share of official reserves. Two thirds of 
the variation in the dollar share of foreign exchange reserves is related to the export 
invoicing in dollars or the respective currency’s dollar zone weight. Data limitations 
make it hard to distinguish these two factors.  
A panel analysis of five countries from central and eastern Europe shows that 
both trade invoicing and currency movements drove a decline in the portion of 
official reserves invested in the dollar. The gravity model tells us that these countries 
naturally traded more with the euro area, and, since they are small countries selling 
to a big market, invoicing exports in euros also came naturally. Both factors 
encouraged a more stable exchange rate against the euro than the dollar, either as 
a market outcome (eg Poland) or as a policy choice (eg Bulgaria). 
Looking forward, our findings also have implications for the possible evolution 
of China’s reserves and the renminbi as a reserve currency. Ito and Chinn (2015) 
show that the average of the dollar share in export invoicing among the Asian 
economies is as high as 90%, indicating that the supply chains in Asia are linked by 
dollar invoices. If the renminbi displaces the dollar in trade invoicing, it will not 
provide guidance in the choice of China’s own reserve composition, since China 
cannot hold its own currency in its reserves. Instead, the management of the 
renminbi against major currencies will, according to Graph 2, provide the guidance. 
The basket management of the renminbi that figures in official statements would 
suggest, if anything, a smaller share of dollar reserves than the global average of 
over 60%.
9
 
For China’s trading partners, both changing trade invoicing and currency 
movements could make renminbi reserves more attractive. The strategy of renminbi 
internationalisation since 2009 has been to allow the renminbi to be used across 
borders in the settlement of trade. If this leads to trade invoicing in the renminbi, 
(which involves a redistribution of currency risk between the two trading 
counterparties relative to invoicing in the dollar, euro or yen), then our results 
suggest that the renminbi will become more attractive as a reserve currency.  
But our results also suggest that larger co-movement of the currencies of 
China’s trading partners with the renminbi is part of the story. We have seen in 
central and eastern Europe how changes in currency movements eventually 
accompanied changes in trade invoicing. On this view the debate over the extent to 
which the other currencies are co-moving with the renminbi is important 
(Subramanian and Kesssler (2013), Kawai and Pontines (2015), and Shu et al (2014). 
Increased co-movement of Asian and commodity currencies with the renminbi 
 
9
 For discussion, see Frankel and Wei (2007), Frankel (2009), and Ma and McCauley (2010). 
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could result in more rapid than commonly thought shifts in the composition of 
reserves towards the renmiinbi. 
Annex: Further panel analysis of central and eastern Europe 
By using the euro share of exports instead of the dollar share of exports in a panel 
otherwise identical to that reported in Table 3, we are able to boost the size of the 
sample. Estimations with larger samples yield results that are qualitatively similar 
(Table A). Since the euro share should rise when the dollar share declines, or vice 
versa, we should expect the opposite sign for the variable for the euro share in 
export invoicing. The magnitude of the euro share of trade coefficient is larger in 
absolute terms while that of the dollar zone share is smaller. 
 
Panel analysis of the US dollar share of reserves in central and eastern Europe 
Dependent variable: share of USD in reserves Table A 
 OLS FE RE OLS FE RE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% of Euro  0.01 -0.94 -0.91 0.27 -0.77 -0.68 
in exports (0.23) (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.19) (0.15)*** (0.16)*** 
Dollar Zone     0.35 0.13 0.15 
Weight    (0.06)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** 
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Adj. R2 -0.02 0.34 . 0.31 0.41 . 
Overall R2 . 0.00 0.00 . 0.05 0.08 
Between R2 . 0.27 0.27 . 0.04 0.01 
Within R2 . 0.39 0.39 . 0.47 0.46 
Notes: OLS denotes ordinary least squares; FE, fixed effects; RE, random effects. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. t-statistics are in brackets. 
Estimates of the constant term are not reported. 
Source: authors’ estimates. 
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Highlights for Ito, McCauley and Chan, “Emerging market currency composition of 
reserves, denomination of trade and currency movements”. 
Historical evidence links the currency composition of reserves to currency 
movements. 
The currency composition of reserves is strongly related in the cross-section to 
both currency movements and the currency denomination of trade but it is hard to 
distinguish these two factors. 
A panel analysis of 5 countries from central and eastern Europe shows that both 
trade invoicing and currency movements drive changing official reserve 
composition. 
Implications are suggested for the prospects for the renminbi 
internationalisation. 
